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The dilemma of the failed state thesis in post-9/11 world affairs 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted the emphasis of failed states 
as just a regional humanitarian problem to one that could 
present a global security threat. In this regard US policymakers, 
especially, identified failed states as possible terrorist threats. 
However, this renewed attention to the study of state failure has 
exposed a number of theoretical weaknesses in this body of 
literature. The latter could mainly be ascribed to the way in 
which US policy makers have often used generalised definitions 
of failed states and then applied it to states that are perceived 
as threats. Another problem is the fact that government spon-
sored research institutes and think tanks are operating in-
dependently from university academics. This situation has 
caused theoretical confusion as conditions in failed states are 
often interpreted differently resulting in the development of a 
number of opposing theories, definitions and confusing classifi-
cation models. The body of literature is further accused of en-
dorsing a “Weberian” definition (ideal type) of the state against 
which degrees of “failure” in non-complying states are mea-
sured. This article will investigate the extent of these theoretical 
weaknesses and expose the dangers of following an approach 
that seem to misinterpret the political realities of developing 
states (often regarded as failed) – this despite having an ex-
tensive popular following. It will further focus on possible alter-
native approaches – or the formulation of ideas that are better 
suited and relevant to the often unique internal political, social 
and economic dynamics of unstable states. 
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Opsomming 
Die dilemma van die mislukte staattesis in internasionale 
verhoudings na 9/11 
Die 9/11-terroriste aanvalle het die fokus van mislukte state as 
bloot streeksgebonde humanitêre probleme verskuif na een wat 
’n globale sekuriteitsrisiko kan inhou. Veral Amerikaanse be-
leidmakers het mislukte state ná hierdie insident as potensiële 
terroristebedreigings begin identifiseer. Die hernude belangstel-
ling in die studie van mislukte state het egter ook ’n aantal teo-
retiese tekortkomings binne hierdie studieterrein blootgelê. 
Laasgenoemde kan toegeskryf word aan die wyse waarop veral 
Amerikaanse beleidmakers dikwels veralgemeende definisies 
van mislukte state gebruik en dit dan toepas op state wat as 
“misluk” beskou word. ’n Verdere probleem is die feit dat rege-
ringsgefinansierde navorsingsinstitute en dinkskrums dikwels 
onafhanklik van akademici by universiteite funksioneer. Hierdie 
stand van sake lei tot teoretiese verwardheid, aangesien toe-
stande in mislukte state dikwels verskillend geïnterpreteer word. 
Die gevolg hiervan is dat teenstrydige teorieë, definisies en 
klassifikasiemodelle dikwels ontwikkel word. Die studieterrein 
word verder daarvan beskuldig dat dit ’n “Weberiaanse” (ideaal-
tipiese) definisie van die staat onderskryf om verskillende grade 
van mislukking by nie-toegeeflike state te bepaal. Hierdie artikel 
sal poog om die omvang van hierdie teoretiese tekortkomings 
te ondersoek en te fokus op die gevare van ’n benadering wat 
oënskynlik die politieke realiteite binne ontwikkelende state (wat 
dikwels as misluk beskou word) misinterpreteer. Ten slotte sal 
aandag geskenk word aan moontlike alternatiewe benaderings, 
of die formulering van idees wat meer relevant en toepaslik is 
vir die dikwels unieke interne politieke, sosiale en ekonomiese 
dinamika van onstabiele state.  
1. Introduction 
The increased interest in the “failed state” phenomenon can be 
traced back to events that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1989 (Wesley-Smith, 2004:4-5). However, the changes that were 
brought about by the collapse of Communism soon exposed the 
vulnerabilities of weaker states across the globe. The term failed 
state was first coined to describe a number of humanitarian disas-
ters that took place in the 1990s in places such as Somalia, Haiti, 
Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and the Great Lakes region 
of Africa, and particularly Rwanda (Wesley-Smith, 2004:5; Sur, 
2006:1). Theorists were mainly concerned with the often tragic hu-
manitarian consequences of state failure that included refugee pro-
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blems, displacement of people, human rights violations and geno-
cide. The view that state failure only had domestic or regional stra-
tegic significance came to an abrupt end on 11 September, 2001 
when Al-Qaeda terrorists launched devastating attacks on financial 
and military targets in New York and Washington, D.C.  
In the aftermath of these attacks the threat of “failed states” – es-
pecially in terms of the possibility of them harbouring terrorist groups 
– was seemingly popularised by US policymakers to justify its “war 
on terror”. This has focused renewed attention and interest in the 
study of state failure but has also exposed a number of theoretical 
weaknesses in this body of literature. US policymakers, for instance, 
seem to use a generalised definition of failed states which is then 
just arbitrarily applied to states perceived as security threats. The 
failed state literature is also divided by mainly government spon-
sored research institutes and think tanks that operate independently 
from academics at universities. The views of these two camps are 
often contradicting which causes further theoretical confusion. De-
spite this, state leaders, governments and non-governmental agen-
cies seem to rely strongly on the findings of failed state theorists and 
think tanks to make policy decisions. This article will investigate the 
extent of these theoretical weaknesses and expose the dangers of 
following an approach that seem to misinterpret the political realities 
of developing states (often regarded as failed) – this despite having 
an extensive popular following. It will further focus on possible 
alternative approaches – or the formulation of ideas that are better 
suited and relevant to the often unique internal political, social and 
economic dynamics of unstable states.  
This article will commence by briefly focusing on a Western “Webe-
rian” approach to the state as the theoretical point of departure. 
Thereafter emphasis will be placed on the failed state thesis’ 
endorsement of this view as the benchmark (ideal type state) 
against which conditions in failed states are measured. Criticism 
against the apparent theoretical weaknesses in this body of lite-
rature will then receive attention. After a brief defence of the failed 
state thesis’ endorsement of the “Weberian” ideal-type state, em-
phasis will be placed on possible theoretical alternatives to those 
that are currently offered by this body of literature.  
2. The “Weberian” state – a brief conceptualisation 
In the words of Heywood (2002:86) the term state has been used 
“… to refer to a bewildering range of things: a collection of 
institutions, a territorial unit, a philosophical idea, an instrument of 
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coercion or oppression and so on”. One of the reasons for this 
confusion seems to be the fact that the state has been understood 
from idealistic, functionalist and organisational perpectives. For the 
purposes of this article the author adheres to elements of both the 
functionalist and organisational approaches to the state. In terms of 
the first, focus is placed on the role and purpose of state institutions 
with particular emphasis on the state as a set of institutions that has 
to guarantee order and deliver social stability. In terms of the 
organisational perspective the state is broadly perceived as the 
apparatus of government or the set of institutions that are “public” 
because they are responsible for the collective organisation of social 
existence. A clear distinction is therefore made between the state 
and civil society. According to this view the state comprises the 
various institutions of government which includes the bureaucracy, 
the military, the police, the courts as well as the social security 
system.  
Some of the characteristics of organisational perspective can be 
traced back to fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe when cen-
tralised rule succeeded in subordinating all other institutions and 
groups. The modern nation state came into being with the signing of 
the Peace Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. These treaties laid down 
the basic rules of what would later become the requirements of 
statehood. By adhering to these requirements, states were not only 
recognised by other states as equal but they also earned the right to 
rule over their particular territories without interference from other 
states (Scholte, 1999:19-21; Heywood, 2002:86). A permanent 
population living within the confines of a demarcated territory with a 
sovereign government became the key requirements and charac-
teristics of the modern state. (Compare the definitions of Frost, 
1997:1-18; Jackson & Jackson, 1997:34-35; and Vincent, 2004:40.) 
However, in arguably the most influential definition Max Weber 
(quoted in Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:2) describes the state as a  
… corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises 
continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a 
territory and its population including all action taking place in the 
area of its jurisdiction.  
By focusing on a government’s ability to use force within its territory, 
Weber emphasises the empirical (de facto), rather than the juridical 
(de jure) attributes of statehood. The main point of departure in the 
definition of Weber is whether the state has the ability to exercise 
the overwhelming monopoly of force within its territorial jurisdiction.  
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Under the influence of, and elaborating on, the Weberian definition, 
Migdal (1988:19) defines what he calls a “strong state” (also inter-
preted as an ideal type state) as  
… an organization composed of various agencies led and 
coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that 
has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding 
rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making 
for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if 
necessary to have it’s way.  
He defines the capabilities a state should possess and then com-
pares Third World states to that definition. A state’s capabilities 
would include the capacity to penetrate society, regulate social rela-
tions, the ability to extract resources as well as the use and effective 
distribution of these resources. In his view strong states possessed 
high capabilities to complete these tasks while weak states were 
placed on the low end of the spectrum of capabilities. In both these 
definitions (with a strong institutional focus), emphasis is placed on 
state capacity or the state’s ability to provide order and state ser-
vices or public goods such as health, education, infrastructure, 
social services, an efficient labour market and a healthy environment 
among many other things (Speiser & Handy, 2005:11).  
In fulfilling these duties the state must play a minimal role (cha-
racteristic of a minimal state) in that it must merely act as a 
protective body, with the task of providing a framework of peace and 
social order in which its citizens can live up to their full potential. The 
state should only be called upon when orderly existence is threa-
tened. It must therefore fulfil the role of a “referee” that has the abi-
lity to protect each citizen from the encroachments of fellow citizens. 
From this pluralist perspective the state is seen as neutral and acts 
in the interest of all citizens. It represents the common good or 
public interest (Heywood, 2002:88-89).  
The Weberian definition of the state, with its strong emphasis on 
state capacity and upholding law and order has found favourable 
expression within a liberal democratic political system (regime). 
Different ways of ordering state power, that is, democratic, totalita-
rian and authoritarian, are indicative of distinctive regime types (Du 
Toit, 1995:28-29). Political regimes are further described by Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997:9-10) as sets of political procedures – often 
referred to as the “rules of the game” – that determine the 
distribution of political power. In this regard Joseph Schumpeter 
(1947:269) refers to democracy as “… a system for arriving at poli-
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tical decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. This further 
implicates civil and political liberties such as freedom of speech, the 
right to publish and the right to organise public meetings. A liberal 
democratic system further needs to adhere to the principles of “good 
governance”, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In 
the following section focus will be placed on how the Weberian 
definition of the state has been embraced by the “failed state thesis” 
as their theoretical point of departure. 
3. The failed state thesis and the “Weberian ideal type” 
state 
According to Hill (2005:144-145) the failed state thesis refers to an 
explanation about socio-political crisis as well as the body of lite-
rature in which this argument is developed and promoted. In short: 
The principle aims of the literature therefore, are to investigate 
and explain why state failure occurs; to outline and identify 
ways of identifying failed states; to identify states that are failed 
or are in danger of failing; to describe the processes of failure; 
and to consider how state failure can be either prevented or 
reversed. (Hill, 2005:145.)  
In their attempts to address the aforementioned aims, this body of 
literature has developed the notion of an “ideal-type” (or strong) 
state against which conditions in “failed states” are measured. In 
defining such an ideal-type state Eriksen (2006:2-6) identifies two 
different approaches to state failure (based on their proponent’s 
understanding of the state). The most prominent of these approach-
es finds its inspiration in the Weberian definition of the state dis-
cussed in the previous section. Emphasis is strongly placed on the 
state’s ability to maintain order within its jurisdiction through the use 
of legitimate force. Can the state therefore guarantee a safe environ-
ment for its population and does it have firm political control over its 
whole territory? In failed states, governments often control only part 
of its territory (usually the capital) while other parts are controlled by 
different factions. In other words, the state loses physical control 
over its territory (Williams, 2007:1-2). Recent incidences of piracy of 
the Somali coast serve as an example of how ruling factions have 
turned to lawlessness and criminality in the absence of a strong 
government that is supposed to guarantee order and exercise firm 
control over its territory (Kraska & Wilson, 2008/2009:41-52). In such 
an environment the government is also unable to provide security to 
its whole population. Jackson (2000:296) adds that failed states are 
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unable or refuse to safeguard minimal civil conditions for their 
citizens such as domestic peace, law and order and good gover-
nance. In fact, most postcolonial states lack positive sovereignty 
(empirical statehood), or the ability to control their territory, may 
have to deal with armed insurgents and have little ability to im-
plement policies or promote economic development. Despite this, 
these states persist and continue to be recognised as equal parti-
cipants in the state system. Jackson (1990) describe these entities 
as quasi-states. Woodward (2004:2) adds that state failure becomes 
almost inevitable when there is “… a credible challenge to the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force or its outright loss of that 
monopoly”. States that are therefore not able to accomplish the 
latter are regarded as failed.  
The second underlying, or Lockean approach, is supported by au-
thors such as William Zartman (1995) and Robert I. Rotberg (2003) 
who interpret the role of the state as that of a service provider. In 
this view states collapse when the latter can no longer provide the 
services for which it exists. Apart from the fact that it is expected of 
the state to provide security for its citizens it is also the state’s duty 
to deliver other public goods in a variety of social sectors. These 
services include health, education, infrastructure, social services, an 
efficient labour market and a healthy environment among many 
other things. It is further expected of the state to provide transparent 
mechanisms for the redistribution of economic resources. In terms of 
the second approach failure is commonly used to highlight the way 
in which a state, either because of lack of capacity or a lack of poli-
tical will, fail to provide public goods to the entire population instead 
of just a segment of it.  
In an attempt to determine the degrees to which different (weak) 
states are unable to comply to the minimum requirements of state-
hood a number of scholars such as Geldenhuys (1999), Rotberg 
(2002) and Gros (1996) have developed classification models in 
which the degrees of deterioration in these states are measured 
against conditions in an ideal-type state (referring to Weber’s defi-
nitions of the state). This approach gauges degrees of stateness 
along a continuum starting with those states that meet classical 
Weberian criteria of statehood and ending with those that meet none 
of these criteria of successful statehood. The closer a state comes 
to fulfilling the ideals of statehood the closer its position will be to the 
ideal-type state indicating that it experiences a lesser degree of 
failure. States that have a limited or no capacity to fulfil the require-
ments of statehood are placed further away from the ideal-type state 
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indicating higher degrees of deterioration. In spite of slight dif-
ferences, most of the classification models distinguish between a 
number of broad categories of failed states namely soft, weak, 
failing, failed and collapsed states. In the following section attention 
will be given to criticism against the supposedly weak theoretical 
foundations the failed state thesis is constructed on.  
4. A critique of the failed state thesis 
4.1 Failed states as terrorist havens 
In the aftermath of September eleventh’s terrorist attacks the strate-
gic impact of state failure has shifted from a regional (and limited) to 
a global threat (Helman & Ratner, 1993:3-20; Raeymakers, 2005:3). 
The term failed state was popularised for the first time in the New 
National Security Strategy, a foreign policy document released in 
2002 by the United States government in reaction to the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks. Failed states were identified as a serious national se-
curity threat, linking it to the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, criminal networks and of course terrorism (Wise, 2004:7; 
Takeyh & Gvodsev, 2003:96). According to Rice (2003:2) the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) particularly focused on the threat 
that failed states posed in terms of providing “safe havens” for 
terrorist organisations. Dunlap (2007:3) argues that failed states are 
currently a major concern for analysts and policymakers for three 
reasons. Firstly, because of the chaos and lawlessness that exist in 
these societies terrorist organisations can conduct their activities 
without fear of capture or punishment. In the second place, failed 
states often provide terrorist groups with access to all the necessary 
resources they need to conduct their activities, including money and 
recruits. In the third place, failed states provide terrorist groups with 
the protection of their sovereignty (Takeyh & Gvodsev, 2003:7-8). 
Despite its seemingly dominant position in world affairs, the (“mostly 
American”) perspective that failed states provide terrorist havens 
has been challenged by a body of literature that include among 
others the contributions of Patrick (2006); Mills (2004:157-169); Von 
Hippel (2002:25-39) and Logan and Preble (2006). Patrick (2006:34-
35) argues that the connection between state weakness and 
transnational terrorism is more complicated and tenuous than often 
assumed. Firstly, not all weak or failed states are characterised or 
afflicted by terrorism. In the 49 countries that have recently been 
categorised by the United Nations as the least developed, hardly 
any terrorist activity occurs. The lack or absence of state capacity 
(often regarded as a key characteristic of state failure) per se is 
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unable to explain why terrorist activity is concentrated in specific 
regions, particularly the Middle East and broader Muslim world in-
stead of other regions such as Central Africa. Secondly, not all acts 
of terrorism that occur in weak and failing states are transnational. 
This is illustrated by the fact that much of these terrorist acts are 
self-contained action by insurgents motivated by local political 
grievances or national liberation struggles such as the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (Patrick, 2006:34; Mills, 
2004:157-169). Thirdly, in terms of the degrees of failure that they 
experience, not all weak and failing states are equal. Adherents to 
the failed state thesis are fond of arguing that terrorists are attracted 
to collapsed, lawless polities such as Somalia or Liberia. On the 
contrary, terrorists are often more likely to use weak but functioning 
states such as Pakistan or Kenya as their organisational bases 
(Patrick, 2006:35; Mills, 2004:161-162).  
Observers such as Logan and Preble (2006:6) go so far as to argue 
that the United States is just arbitrarily linking acts of terrorism to a 
very generalised definition of failed states as justification to drive its 
war on terror. The US government should, instead of issuing cate-
gorical statements about who or what they perceive to be failed 
states, rather examine countries, failed or otherwise, on the basis of 
discrete measures of threat assessment: to determine the intentions 
of governments and non-governmental organisations in terms of 
attacking the United States. Empirical data on failed states have 
proven that state failure rarely translates into security threats to the 
United States. It is therefore argued that the United States is com-
mitting “strategic overkill” by exaggerating the global terrorist threat 
posed by failed states. It relies on a generalised definition of state 
failure (often not even distinguishing between weak, failing or col-
lapsed states) without making a thorough analysis of the unique 
political, cultural, religious and economic dynamics that exist in 
these states. However, it would be unfair to hold failed state theo-
rists responsible for the apparent ideological misuse of its analytical 
approach by US policymakers just as it would be ridiculous to hold 
Karl Marx’s ideas responsible for the misconduct of Joseph Stalin. 
Regardless of this, a number of theoretical shortcomings have been 
identified by critics of the failed state thesis.  
4.2 Weak theoretical foundations 
The general concern about the apparent theoretical weakness of the 
failed state thesis is summarised by Woodward (2004:5) who argues 
that it has generated  
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…very bad or superficial research. The measures are abysmal, 
the studies are tautological (the exact same empirical measures 
are used for both cause and outcome), and there is no real 
effort at causal analysis, identifying the causal links between 
state fragility and these outcomes of concern.  
In this regard two theoretical weaknesses can be identified.  
4.2.1 Failure of the concept as an analytical category 
Commentators such as Doornbos (2002:797-815) and Milliken and 
Krause (2002:1-21) have suggested that the literature on state 
failure and collapse suffer from a number of dangerous flaws. Not 
only is it littered with obscure definitions but the causes and con-
sequence of the concept tends to be blurred. These flaws and 
obscurities have become painfully apparent where different cate-
gories of polities such as quasi, weak, failed, failing, flawed, fragile 
and collapsed have been used by different observers as if their 
meanings are exactly the same. Words such as weak and failed are 
for instance used interchangeably to describe conditions in states 
that might actually be collapsing. According to Woodward (2004:4) 
the situation is further complicated by the fact that the failed state 
concept represented a coming together of humanitarian, human 
rights, development and security perspectives (or distinct academic 
communities) although the term held different meanings to each of 
these perspectives. This problem can probably be ascribed to the 
fact that much of the current literature on state failure no longer 
comes from university departments but purposely set up govern-
ment funded research institutes and think tanks that function in most 
instances separately from academic institutions. In terms of their 
understanding and interpretation of the concept, none of these 
perspectives seem to share common ground and further appear to 
be speaking past each other (Hameiri, 2007:124).  
Woodward (2004:4) adds that the term failed state is not defined in a 
way that makes it possible to analyse empirically. The definition of 
the term is not only vague but also just a list of characteristics and 
assumed consequences. Many observers and policy orientated 
projects within this body of literature have attempted to formulate 
indicators that are intuitively logical and supposed to be widely 
shared among “failed” states.1 It is assumed that one or all of these 
                                      
1 In his work When states fail: causes and consequences, Robert I. Rotberg 
(2004:5) compiles a list of possible indicators of state failure that includes civil 
wars, disharmony between communities, loss of control over peripheral regions, 
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indicators can be observed in these states. The term failed state is 
regarded as self evident and applied to specific cases. Diverse 
states (as mentioned above) are characterised as failed states al-
most by academic endorsement. Conditions in these states (how-
ever different they might be) are taken to be evidence of what is left 
more or less unexplained. Even in academic journals that aspire to 
theoretical excellence and rigor, the concept tends to crash into 
impressionist description. According to Call (2006:7-8) observers 
have often attempted to apply a single remedy to states in which 
“symptoms” ranging from poverty to civil war, can be identified, 
hoping that such a remedy would be able to cure all problems.  
4.2.2 Inability to explain 
According to Gourevitch (2005:6-9) the failed state thesis attributes 
state failure to the inappropriateness of the state or sovereignty as a 
norm. The state is regarded as an artificial import or coercive im-
position on societies (mostly states in the Third World) unfit for that 
kind of political organisation. By arbitrarily drawing political bounda-
ries around diverse ethnic identities, it forced together incompatible 
political communities. Because of their lack of understanding of the 
dynamics of domestic politics, failed state theorists have tended to 
identify ethnicity and ethnic conflict as a logical given which would 
make the possibility of creating national unity highly unlikely. To 
them the breakdown of state institutions was inevitable due to these 
divisions (Rotberg, 2004; Herbst, 2000:106-112). Sovereignty is 
perceived just as negatively, specifically because of the argument 
that failed state’s juridical statehood was legally protected at the 
expense of developing effective empirical statehood. States no 
longer had to prove empirical capacity, as was the situation under 
the pre-UN dispensation, in order to obtain international legal status. 
Governments in these states could abuse this right in order to 
commit atrocities and enrich themselves at the expense of their 
populations. The needs of the local populations could no longer be 
met by these states and political autonomy no longer had any 
material justification (Gourevitch, 2005:7-8; Jackson, 1990:21-31; 
Eriksen, 2006:4-6). 
                                                                                                             
growth in criminal violence, cessation of functioning legislatures and judiciaries, 
informal privatisation of education, health and other social services, loss of 
legitimacy and declining per capita GDP. Broadly the same criteria are also 
identified in the annual Failed State Index produced by the Fund for Peace in 
Foreign Policy journal (Failed State Index, 2008:64-68). 
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Focus is further placed on the chaos and anarchy that has sup-
posedly contaminated the whole state instead of for instance, 
government institutions that is but one component of the state. Ob-
servers within the failed state literature have an obsession with the 
supposed internal chaos and disorder that seems to be at the order 
of the day in these states (also compare the contribution of Kaplan, 
1994:40-76). However, there are profound differences between 
anarchy defined as the absence of government institutions and the 
actual breakdown of indigenous social structures. Instead of focus-
ing on the collapse of a specific set of institutions it is argued that 
the state itself has collapsed. The fact that the state itself has some-
how failed is supposed to be novel in comparison to other historical 
political conditions such as revolutions, civil wars, wars of secession 
or wars of national liberation. Where comparative politics used to 
make distinctions between revolutions, civil wars and wars of seces-
sion, these political crises are assimilated under the broad church of 
anarchy because they are manifestations of one thing: disorder. 
Because of the view that “domestic anarchy” is responsible for state 
failure, it implies that policymakers do not have to understand the 
local dynamics that drive a conflict, nor recognise specific groups as 
legitimate actors in the conflict. Instead the situation can merely be 
treated as chaos, which a disinterested third party can resolve with 
the proper policy instruments. It is therefore tailored more to 
Western priorities than domestic reality (Gourevitch, 2005:4).  
The inability of failed state theorists to explain the intricate internal 
social dynamics of states (that they perceive as failed and racked by 
disorder) is, in a twist of irony, due to their weak theoretical under-
standing of the state. Their inability to separate conceptually be-
tween institutions that serve certain purposes (such as government, 
security or welfare) and the state as a whole is symptomatic of this 
(also compare the views of Rotberg, 2004; Zartman, 1995). The 
state can not be described as just a set of institutions but rather a 
specific kind of relationship between these institutions and society. 
Only when they are derived from the will of the governed can these 
institutions become state institutions. The state further comprises 
those institutions that are materialisations of sovereign political 
power; it is the sovereign that instantiates its power and purposes in 
institutions. In terms of this explanation a “strong” state with the 
institutional capacity to repress may in fact be “weaker” in the sense 
of lacking any basis in their society (also compare the contribution of 
Demetriou, 2003:106-108). The collapse of certain institutions (for 
instance an absolute monarchy) may be a precondition for es-
tablishing the state on a new social basis, rather than a sign of 
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failure. Throughout history, periods of crisis (such as revolutions and 
civil war) have marked shifts like these in society as well as trans-
formations in the relations between state and society (Gourevitch, 
2005:13).  
4.3 Normative model of the state 
Woodward (2004:5) is of the opinion that the failed state literature 
tends to base their arguments on a particular normative model of the 
state – in this regard a free market orientated liberal democratic 
state that is transparent and accountable and further possesses very 
specific institutional requirements. In terms of the latter, the state is, 
for instance, required to guarantee and uphold the monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence and provide a number of essential 
services (see the section on the conceptualisation of the failed state 
thesis). It is therefore nothing more than a value-based notion about 
what the state is supposed to be and a patronising approach to 
scoring states based on their abilities to adhere to those values. The 
extent of the inability to comply with the latter will determine degrees 
of failure whether that is weak, failed or collapsed (Call, 2006:11; 
Eriksen, 2006:4). However, very few Western states have the ability 
to fulfil all the requirements of statehood as prescribed by the ideal 
type standard. If these requirements of statehood had to be applied 
strictly, most Western states would also display signs of state failure! 
The capabilities of mostly postcolonial states are therefore com-
pared with states in the West. The strengths, successes, weaknes-
ses and failures of states are simplistically reduced to an empirically 
observable capacity to manipulate coercive resources resulting in an 
antidemocratic overtone of control and subordination (Bilgin & 
Morton, 2002:62-63).  
Hill (2004:8) and Dolek (2005:2) contend that the supposed de-
viancy of failed states from Western norms is expressed in lan-
guage, imagery and analogies used to describe them (failed states). 
Conditions in failed states are often perceived as similar to an 
“illness” in comparison to “healthy” Western states. In extreme cases 
commentators even go so far as using terminology of psycho-
analysis to describe conditions in failed states. This comparison thus 
entails a neglect of history, demography, culture and economics and 
their relationship to regional dynamics and patterns. In this case it is 
almost like comparing apples and oranges. However, in spite of the 
criticism it has received, the use of a Western statecentric approach 
has also been defended by failed state theorists.  
The dilemma of the failed state thesis in post-9/11 world affairs 
764   Koers 73(4) 2008:751-770 
Call (2006:6) is adamant that the failed state thesis has made some 
positive contributions by helping to “… advance research, resources, 
and policy attention to states which are not serving their popu-
lations”. This body of literature justifies its use of a statecentric 
approach on the basis that no other form of social organisation has 
ever succeeded in replacing the state, nor has any other form been 
as comprehensive in terms of its characteristics and function. The 
“ideal type” state remains the only standard against which conditions 
in other states can be measured. In addition Eriksen (2006:7-8) 
provides three reasons why theories of liberal democratic Western 
states (ideal type state used by the failed state thesis) are relevant 
for understanding non-Western states (which is often characterised 
as failed). Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the formal institu-
tions of all states are constructed on the European model of state-
hood. Although institutions (such as courts, parliaments and bureau-
cracies) in postcolonial states have been imported in the sense that 
they originate from Europe, they nevertheless remain the basis for 
all contemporary states. Secondly, regardless of whether states are 
Western or non-Western, they all form part of the global system of 
states. The modern state form is, therefore, universally recognised 
as the fundamental political unit. In view of the universal acceptance 
of this notion of statehood, even states that do not possess these 
defining features of statehood are recognised on the presumption 
that they do possess them. Thirdly, when focus is placed on social 
scientific analysis, one is compelled to use the language of that 
science which, in this case, happens to be Western in origin. This, 
however, does not imply that there are no differences between 
Western and non-Western states or that theoretical models based 
on Western ideas and conceptions must be applied uncritically in all 
contexts (Eriksen, 2006:7-8).  
5. Alternatives to the failed state thesis? 
Eriksen (2006:8) concludes that the Western notion of statehood is 
indispensable. What is, however, problematic with the failed state 
thesis is not that it employs concepts derived from theories of 
Western origin, but rather which Western concepts it applies and 
how. For instance, commentators such as Zartman (1995), Rotberg 
(2003) and Jackson (1990) use a specific idealised notion of state-
hood (ideal type state) which is used as a yardstick from which 
deviations are measured. Call (2006:12-17) is adamant that if one 
accepts the deficiencies of the failed state concept an appropriate 
alternative response need to be developed. Although he admits that 
the suggestions are tentative and normative they do reflect a 
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reaction against the deficiencies of the failed state concept (as dis-
cussed above). Additional research is needed which suggests that a 
vast new field of study might be possible.  
A major problem with the failed state thesis is its narrow focus on 
states and state strength which often leads to crude and clumsy 
policy responses. It is imperative to rather develop tailored policy re-
sponses to specific contexts. By making use of a more contextua-
lised approach the underlying and proximate causes of, for instance, 
armed conflict can be better analysed. In terms of the latter a more 
anthropological approach is suggested as an alternative to the more 
state centered one. For external actors (donors, diplomats, develop-
ment specialists and peacekeepers) such an approach  
… devises strategies based on the past trajectory and eschews 
reliance on any external model. Each strategy is ideally sui 
generis, reflecting none of the biases inherent in drawing on the 
models of other countries, far or near (Call, 2006:12-13).  
Call (2006:14-17) further suggests that the classification system 
used by the failed state thesis (in terms of which states are classified 
as weak, failed and collapsed) needs to be revised. New categories 
of states need to be developed which would provide more objective 
reflections of conditions and circumstances in the states under 
discussion. Eriksen (2006:8-10) adds that if an ideal type model of 
the state is used the latter must be adapted in such a way as to 
reflect the internal conditions in the alleged failed states. This im-
plies that an ideal type of the modern state that is derived from the 
properties of mostly liberal democratic Western states cannot be 
used to analyse states that deviate significantly from the ideal type. 
This further implies that a different ideal type (or perhaps several 
different ideal types) based on the properties of the state in question 
need to be developed. As a rather extreme example the neo-patri-
monial state is, for instance, suggested as a possible alternative 
ideal type. In the latter system there is no clear separation between 
private and public interests and public resources are often utilised 
for private purposes. It is also hard to distinguish between the 
personal interests of officials and the interests of the institutions to 
which they belong. In response Call (2006:14-17) suggests a further 
five possible categories of states which are also better aligned to the 
anthropological approach discussed earlier. These categories in-
clude weak states (with a weak formal institutional capacity), divided 
states (which might possess strong institutional capacities but is only 
functioning effectively in certain portions of its territory), wartime 
states and postwartime states (characterised by armed conflicts), 
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semi-stable authoritarian regimes (which comes to power through 
violence and are then able to establish sufficient coercive control to 
repress the opposition), and collapsed states (the absence of any 
national-level authority to which either internal social actors or exter-
nal actors could turn).  
Although the above-mentioned categories might be considered an 
improvement on the neo-patrimonial ideal type, some of the ills of 
the failed state classification models seem to be repeated here. 
Despite moving away from using a liberal democratic Western ideal 
type state model and focusing more strongly on the unique social 
and political dynamics of individual troubled states, the Call (2006) 
classification is still guilty of formulating generalised categories 
based on a number of possible variables that might occur in these 
states. Conditions in a specific state may, for instance, only partly fit 
a category or might not be able to fit into any of the categories. In 
other states, overlaps, in terms of conditions, between different cate-
gories might also occur. This approach is, for instance, still unable to 
explain and classify states in which secessionist factions are able to 
control important areas (often mineral rich) and sustain themselves 
through transborder and international commercial linkages, indepen-
dent of the ruling government (for instance Unita in Angola and the 
Nkunda faction in the DRC). These alternative approaches therefore 
need to be further refined if there is any hope of them replacing the 
dominant and popular classification models of the failed state thesis. 
Although the latter has obvious theoretical flaws very few scholars 
have criticised, or even suggested alternatives to the current failed 
state discourse. In terms of this article, for instance, only two failed 
state critics have suggested and formulated alternative approaches. 
If, as Woodward (2004:5) has suggested, the failed state thesis has 
generated “… very bad or superficial research”, there is a need to 
either replace the whole discourse or to revise its theoretical basis in 
such a way as to provide a more objective analysis of political and 
social conditions in the developing world. A new classification mo-
del, which is more reflective of the unique social dynamics of 
troubled states, will need to be developed. For the same reason the 
normative and Western-centric theoretical approach of the failed 
state thesis is also in need of urgent revision. For this to be suc-
cessfully accomplished more adherents to the failed state thesis 
need to be convinced of its theoretical weaknesses, but also 
encouraged to contribute towards formulating feasible alternatives.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks has shifted the emphasis of failed states 
as just a regional humanitarian problem to one that could present a 
global security threat. In this regard US policymakers, especially, 
identified failed states as possible terrorist threats. However, this 
renewed attention to the study of state failure has exposed a num-
ber of theoretical weaknesses in this body of literature. The latter 
could mainly be ascribed to the way in which US policymakers have 
often used generalised definitions of failed states and then applied it 
to states that were perceived as threats. Another problem is the fact 
that the failed state thesis is not a coherent body of literature but that 
it consists of university academics on the one hand and government 
funded research institutes and think tanks on the other. This situa-
tion has caused theoretical confusion as conditions in failed states 
are interpreted differently by the two camps. This has further re-
sulted in the development of a number of different theories, defini-
tions and confusion classification models. The body of literature has 
further been accused of adhering to a Western (Weberian) ideal 
type state against which conditions in all other states (Western and 
non-Western) are compared and measured. States that do not com-
ply are classified according to the degrees of non-compliance (fail-
ure). This position has, however, been defended on the basis that 
no other form of social organisation has been able to replace the 
state. If state failure is studied the state (ideal type) can be the only 
benchmark or measure to compare conditions in other states. Most 
studies of state failure reflect strong Western sentiments and ap-
proaches. It is therefore logical that the use of a Western ideal type 
state would be prominent. However, stronger emphasis needs to be 
focused on the contributions of non-Western approaches towards 
state failure.  
The study concluded with an emphasis on possible alternative ap-
proaches to those presented by the failed state thesis. Interestingly, 
among all the contributions of critics of the failed state approach in 
this article only two (Call, 2006; Eriksen, 2006) suggested alter-
natives. Furthermore, very few contributions were critical of the 
failed state theory in comparison to the literary thousands of ad-
herents to this body of literature. Both contributors (Call and Eriksen) 
suggest that, in terms of an alternative approach, a form of ideal 
type model of the state will still need to be utilised although it had to 
be revised. The Western notion of statehood remained indispens-
able as long as new categories of states were developed which 
would provide a more objective reflection of conditions and circum-
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stances in the states under discussion. In both these alternative ap-
proaches the contributors provided new classifications of states 
based on circumstances they believed were more reflective of con-
ditions in developing states. However, these alternative approaches 
also seemed as vulnerable to criticism as the failed state classi-
fication models. This suggested that there was still quite a way to go 
in terms of developing an effective alternative to the dominant failed 
state thesis. This, however, opened up the possibilities for develop-
ing a whole new field of study.   
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